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) 
[L. A. No. 25717. In Bank. May 13, 1060.] 
THOMAS E. HULL, Petitioner, v. TIlE SUPERIOR COPRT 
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; GERA-
LINE HULL, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Divorce-Final Judgment-Mandamus to Compel Entry.-If a 
husband against whom an interlocutory divorce decree was 
obtained is entitled to entry of the final decree as a matter of 
right, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel entry of such 
decree. 
[2] Id.-FinaJ. Judgment-Where Movant Is in Contempt of Court. 
-It is within the discretion of the trial court to bar entry 
of a final divorce decree if the moving party is in contempt 
of an order or process of court relating to the divorce action, 
even where there has been no prior adjudication of contempt 
and none is sought. 
[3] Id.-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings.-Failure 
to comply with the terms of a property settlement agreement 
is not punishable by contempt. This rule applies though the 
payments in default were designated as child support if these 
support payments are part of the integrated property settle-
ment. 
[4] Id.-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings.-Obliga-
tions arising under a property settlement agreement, though 
the agreement is incorporated in a divorce decree, are con-
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 128. 
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 136. 
McK. Dig. References: [1) Di\'orce, § 121(7); [2,10,11] Divorce, 
§121(5); [3,4] Divorce, §260; [5,8,12, 16-:ZZ] Divorce, §121; 
[6] Divorce, § 5; [7] Divorce, § 60; [9] Cuntempt, § 3; (13-15] 
Divorce, § 219. 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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tractual, and con telll pt canHot be US I'd to puni~h Illere brl'aeh 
of contract. 
[5] ld.-Final Judgment-Where There Bas Been Breach of Con-
tract.-Eutry of a final divorce decree IlIay not be barred be-
cause of a IlIere breach of an integrated property settlement 
agreement, since to countenance such procedure would be viola-
tive of public policy, which is not to discourage final and 
permanent severance of marriages that have failed. 
[6] Id.-Public Policy.-When a marriage has failed and the 
family has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family life are 
no longer served and divorce will be permitted. Public policy 
does not discourage divorce where the relations between hus-
band and wife are such that the legitimate objects of matri-
mony hm'e been destroyed. 
[7] ld.-Recrimination.-It is not a suffieient basis for denying an 
interlocutory divorce decree that petitioner is also found to be 
at "fault" (Civ. Code, § 13:!). 
[8] ld.-Final Judgment.-Where it has been determined that 
grounds for legal dissolution of a marriage exist (Civ. Code, 
§ 92) and an interlocutory divorce decree has been granted, 
the courts should not bar entry of the final decree on expira-
tion of the intel'loeutory year except for compelling reasons. 
[9] Contempt-Power of Court.-A court should have the right to 
deny its processes and aid to one who stands in contempt or is 
in contempt of its orders. One who has wilfully refused to 
comply with the mandate of a court cannot then compel that 
court to do his bidding. 
[10] Divorce-Final Judgment-Where Movant Is in Contempt of 
Court.-Though the moving party has been adjudicated in con-
tempt, the court is not required to bar entry of a final divorce 
judgment; sueh action remains within the trial court's discre-
tion. If the eourt determines that the public interest will be 
better served by finally and permanently dissolving the marital 
status, it is entirely within its power to do so. 
[11] Id.-Final Judgment-Where Movant Is not in Contempt of 
Court.-If one who stands in contempt of the orders of court 
can still seek, and in the discretion of the eourt receive, a final 
divorce decree, OIle who is not in contempt and who could not 
be adjudged in contempt should stand on a higher plane. If the 
court lacks the power to illlpo~e the punishment of contempt, 
it should not be permitted to asse;;s what is a greater punish-
ment-denial of the legal right to enter into any other relation-
ship; to do so would be to permit the eourt to inflict the con-
tinuance of a repudiated marriage relationship on a party 
because of a claimed breach of contract. 
[12] Id.-Final Judgment.-The marital relationship is severable 
from the property rights which it creates, and final settlement 
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of the rt'iatiollship ~h()uld not be d('pendt'llt on final settle-
ment of eoroll:1 ,'Y I'l'Opt'rty intel't'sts. 
[13] ld.-Disposition of Property-Concept of Divisible Divorce.-
The cOllcept of di\'i~ihle divorce-namely, that severance of 
the personal l'elatinnship is divisible from a determination 
of property and support rights-has become established in our 
law. 
[14] ld.-Disposition of Property-Concept of Divisible Divorce.-
The divisible di\'orce is more than a jurisdictional concept. 
Severnnce of a personal relationship which the law has found 
to be unworkable nnd, as a result, injurious to the public wel-
fare is not dependmt on final settlement of property disputes. 
[15] ld.-Disposition of Property-Concept of Divisible Divorce.-
If husband and wife choose to enter into a property agree-
ment, termination of their personal status should not he con-
ditioned on compliance with this agreeinellt. If they enter into 
an integrated property settlement which provides for sup-
port paymcnts as well as property allocation, the entire agree-
ment is considered a property agreement and should be divisible 
in toto from the final dissolution of their personal status; 
otherwise property disputes, real and specious, could continue 
for years, effeetively preventing' the establishment of any other 
relationship by either party. 
[16] Id.-Final Judgment.-Where divorced parties hnve entered 
into a negotiated contraet and that contract is breached, normal 
contract remcdies are available, and if the trial court were 
permitted to bar entry of 11 final divorce decree because it has 
determined that the contrllct was brenched, nn effective remedy 
of the eourt, heretofore reserved for contempt cases, would 
become a snpple11lentlll remedy for bn-nch of contract. 
[17] ld.-Final Judgment.-Where a wife, subsequent to obtaining' 
an interlocutory divorce decree, filed an action against the hus-
band for breach of a negotiated contract and such action is 
pending, it is improper to pcrmit the withholding of the final 
divorce decree sought by the husband as a club to prevent 
normal determination of contract rights in the contract action. 
[18] ld.-Final Judgment-Fraud.-A trial court has power to bar 
entry of a final divorce decree if the moving party attempts 
to obtain it by fraudulent means. Even n final decree can be 
vncatpd if it has heen ohtained by fraud. 
[19] ld.-Final Judgment-Fraud.-If a divorepd hushnnd were 
to be prc(·!tult·d from ohtaining a Hnal di\'lll'ee deerl'e because 
of alleged fraud in averring in his supporting affidavit for its 
entry that he ha:; complied with all the recjuirements of the 
interlocutory decree where he alleged that he was not in de-
fault and that his failure to COlli ply with certain terms of 
the interlocutory decl'ee was l'xcusahll', then a pending action 
) 
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for breaeh of eOlltrnct brought hy till' wif!', in whi<'h hl' woul,l 
seck to prove that he was not ill default, would be prejuilgl'd 
in ndv:lIlce. 
[20] ld.-Final Judgment-Fraud.-An affi,lavit filed by a ilivorcrd 
husbnnd in support of his request for a final decree did not 
perpetrate a "frnud" on the court because he averred therein 
that he complied with all the requirements of the interlocutory 
decree where all the facts involved in a property dispute be-
tween the parties, made the subject of a pending contract 
action brought by the wife, were before the court, the wife 
had already filed her nffidavits setting forth the husband's 
claimed mi~deeds in conjunction with her motion to bnr entry 
of the final decree, and the husband, three days before the 
anegedly frnudulent affidavit was filed, filed a stntement in 
opposition to the wife's motion in which he set forth the facts 
involved in the property dispute and explained why his failure 
to comply with the decree was excusable. 
l21] ld.-Final Judgment-Effect of Marriage Subsequent to In-
terlocutory Decree.-Entry of a final divorce decree is not a 
reward for good behavior nor is the refusal to grant it a 
punishment. Its purpose is to finany dissolve a relntionship 
which has been severed in fact, and it would serve no legiti-
mate purpose to compel the husband, if he has "remarried" 
in :Mexico, but lives in California, to continue to live in It state 
of bigamy as punishment for already having done so. 
[22] ld.-Final Judgment-Effect of Marriage Subsequent to In-
terlocutory Decree.-A bigamous marriage consummated dur-
ing the interlocutory year is not adequate justification for 
denying the bigamous party a final divorce decree. The law 
does not condemn an individual to eternal illicit relationships 
because he has once erred simply because it does not approve 
of the way in which the union was commenced. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the entry of a final 
divorce judgment. Writ granted. 
Edward M. Raskin and Paul P. Selvin for Petitioner. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William E. Lamo-
reaux, Assistant County Counsel, and Edward A. Nugent, 
Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
Covey & Covey and Jules J. Covey for Real Party in In-
terest. 
PETERS, J.-Geraline Hull secured an interlocutory decree 
of di';orce from her husband, Thomas E. Hull. About 11 
months later Gcralille moved the trial eOllrt to bar the entry 
) 
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of the final drcree if her husband should seek to have such a 
decree cntcred. Shortly thereafter, and after the required 
one-year period had rlapsed, Thomas moved for entry of the 
final drcree. The trial court granted Geraline's motion. 
Thomas petitions for a writ of mandate to compel the entry 
of thc final, contending that he is entitled to such entry as a 
matter of right. With this contention we agree. 
The facts are as follows: On September 3, 1958, after an 
uncontested hearing, Geraline secured an interlocutory decree 
of divorce. The decree incorporated an integrated property 
settlement agreement previously negotiated by the parties. 
This agreement provided, among other things, for the con-
veyance of property then in escrow (subject to an exchange 
agreement by virtue of which Thomas was to convey certain 
property owned by him and receive the particular property 
specified in the settlement) to Geraline, alimony, child sup-
port, vacation payments for the children, and execution by 
Thomas of an irrevocable will creating trust funds for Geraline 
and the children. 
On February 13, 1959, Geraline initiated a contempt pro-
ceeding against Thomas, alleging that he had failed to convey 
the property to her, had failed to execute his will as agreed, 
and had remarried in Mexico in February and was trans-
ferring valuable property to his new "wife." Geraline did not 
appear at the hearing and no evidence was introduced. The 
contempt proceeding was dismissed. 
In April, 1959, Geraline filed a "Notice of Motion in re: 
Determination of Liability of Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant 
for Breach of Certain Provisions of the Interlocutory Judg-
ment of Divorce ... " In May the trial court entered its deter-
mination to the effect that Thomas had not breached the 
agreement. This order was subsequently vacated, and the 
court thcn ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the 
decree. 
In July, 1959, Geraline commenced a civil action against 
Thomas and Lynn Starr (his new "wife") to restrain Thomas 
fronl violating the decree, to restrain Lynn Starr from receiv-
ing any property belonging to Thomas, and to require Thomas 
to either convey the property included in the settlement or to 
pay to ller $150,000 ill cash. (The property was valued at 
$144,000 by the parties.) That civil action is still pending. 
In August, 1959, Geraline filed a motion to prevent the 
entry of the final decree. She alleged the same acts of contract 
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breach as in the previous proccedings. She allmitted that 
Thomas did not actually have the real property to whieh 
she was entitled because the exchange contemplated had newr 
been made, but alleged that this had occurred only because 
Thomas had refused to complete the escrow. Affidavits of her 
attorney and of her real estate broker was submitted to support 
this contention. She further alleged that certain payments 
for the children's vacations had not been made. 
Thomas, by counteraffidavit, admitted noncompliance with 
the contract, but alleged: (1) That the vacation payments 
had not been made because the children had not taken vaca-
tions, and that he had been forced to rescue his son from 
juYt'nile court proceedings initiated by Geraline (she denied 
this) ; and, (2) that the escrow had not been completed be-
cause the other parties to it had disapproved of the covenants 
attached to his property, and not through any wilful action 
on his part. He moved for entry of the final decree. 
After several hearings, the trial court granted Gcraline's 
motion to bar entry of the final decree of divorce. It is this 
order which gives rise to the present petition for a writ of 
mandate to compel the court to enter the final decree. 
[1] If Thomas is entitled to entry of the final decree as 
a matter of right, then mandate is the proper remedy. (Olaud-
ius v. Melvin, 146 Cal. 257 [79 P. 897] ; see also McGuinness v. 
$uperior Court, 196 Cal. 222 [237 P. 42. 40 A.L.R. 1110] ; 
Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250 [165 P. 706, 1 A.L.R. 
]589J; Stewart v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.App.2d 702 [40 P.2d 
529] ; Isakson v. Superior Court, 130 Ca1.App. 180 [19 P.2d 
840] ; Neu,,'cU v. Superior Oourt, 27 Cal.App. 343 [149 P. 998].) 
Thomas contends that since tht're is neither fraud nor mistake 
invoh'ed in the present dispute, and since he cannot be pun-
ished by contempt for breach of an integrated property 
agreement even though his breach is found to be wilful, the 
trial court has no discretion to bar entry of the final decree. 
[2] It is, of course, within the discretion of the trial court 
to bar entry of the final decree of divorce if the moving party 
is in contempt of an order or process of the court relating 
to the divorce action. (W ceks v. Superior Oourt, 187 Cal. 620 
[203 P. 93] ; Pearson v. Superior COllrt, 32 Cal.App.2d 87 
[89 P.2d 162] ; Sullivan v. Superior Court, 72 Cal.App. 531 
[237 P. 782].) This power exists even though there has been 
no prior adjudication of contempt and none is sought (Knack-
stedt v. Superior Oourt, 79 Cal.App.2d 727 [180 P.2d 375]). 
[3] It is equally well settled that failure to comply with 
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the terms·of a property settlement agreement is not punishable 
by contempt. (Bradley v. Superior COllrt, 48 Ca1.2d 509 [310 
P.2d 634].) This rule applks eYrn though the payments in 
default were designated as ehild support if these support 
payments are part of the integrated property settlement 
(Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Ca1.2d 631 [328 P.2d 193] ).1 
[4] Obligations arising under such an agreement, even 
though the agreement is incorporatcd into the decree, are 
contractual, and contempt, of course, cannot be used to punish 
mere breach of contract. 
In the present case the property settlement agreement is 
admittedly an integrated property agreement. Thus, under 
the rule of the eases cited above, Thomas cannot be punished 
by contempt even if it be assumed that the facts alh·ged ill I 
Geraline's affidavit are true. 
[ 5 ] The trial court, in the present case, has barred tIle 
entry of the final deeree for what, at most, is a mere breach 
of contract. To countenanee such a procedure WQuld bc 
violative of the public policy of this state. That policy is not 
to discourage final and permanent severance of marriages 
that have failed. [ 6] It has been stated that: " ... when 
a marriage has failed and the family has ceased to be a unit, 
the purposes of family life are no longer served and divorce 
will be permitted. '[P]ublic policy docs not discourage divorce 
where the relations between husband and wife are such that 
the legitimate objects of matrimony have been utterly de-
stroyed.' [Citing eascs.]" (De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Ca1.2d 
858, at p. 864 [250 P.2d 598J.) The public interest is not 
enhanced by refusing people the right to legally terminate a 
relationship which has already been irrevocably severed in 
fact. The power to prevent the final dissolution of such mar-
'The Bradley and Plumer cases have been criticized. (See Contempt 
Enforcement of "Integrated" Di1:orce Settlements in Cali/oT1lia, 10 
Stan.L.Re\'". 321; see also 4.3 CaI.L.Rev. iS2; 4i CaI.L.Rev. 756.) 
It sllould also be noted that Civil Code section 139 wa~ amended by 
Stats. HI5!), ch. 13[19, p. 36iS, to read in part, as follows: "That portion 
of the dt.!erce or .judgment making any snch allowance or allowances 
[~limony lind child support], and the order or orders of the court to 
enforce the same, including any order for support of children based on 
a proYisioll for ~n('h RUJlPort in an integrated property settlement agree· 
ment, may he modified or revoked at any time at the niscretioll of the 
court except aR to :my amonllt that may ha\'"e accrued prior to the orner 
of modification or re\'"ocation." The amended portion of this section, 
which permits the court to modify or re\'"oke <,hild support pro\'ision~ 
which ha\'"(' he(-n madl' part of an int,'grntl'd property settlement agree· 
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ria::res should be uKetl only when lIel'l'ssary to presel've the 
authority of the eourL 
[7] It is no lon~l'l' a suffi('ipnt ha~is for tkuying an inter-
locutory tkl'ree that the petitioll('l' is also found tljl be at 
"fault" (Dc Burgh y. Dc Burgh, supra; Civ. Code, § 132), It 
should be equally immaterial that the moving party has been 
guilty of a breadl of tontruc·t not constituting a eont(,lllpt, 
or of some impl'oper conduct not directly related to the divorce 
proceedinj!. 
In Dc Burgh Y. Dc Burgh, supra, this ('ourt expressed the 
conviction that en forced continuation of a relationsliip which 
has been destroyed could serve no useful public policy but 
would, instead, serve to foster adulterous associations as well 
as intensify "the oppressive ef'fel>t upon children and the 
('ommullit~-.... " (39 Ca1.2d at p. 864.) 
If parties are permitted to dissoh'e a marriage legally WlH'1l 
the legitimate objects of that marriage haye becn destroyed, • 
they will be able to build new liyes and new homes which may 
possess the stability and happiness the previous relationship 
lacked. At the very least they will not be forced into improper 
relationships by the very law they, and their dlildrell, are 
admonished to respect. That this result is of grratcr benefit 
to the public welfare than enforced continuation of a status 
which has been totally repudiated by the pnrtil's is obvious. 
[8] California has speeified the ('x('lusive grounds upon 
which legal dissolution of the marriage can be predicated 
(Civ. Code, § 92). But once it has been determined that sueh 
grounds exist and an interlocutory decree of divorce llas been 
granted the courts should not bar entry of the final decree 
upon the expiration of the interlocutory year except for com-
pelling reasons. 
[9] A court should have the right to deny its processes 
and aid to one who stands in contempt or is in contempt of 
its orders. One who has wilfully refnsrd to comply with the 
mandate of a court cannot then compel that conrt to do his 
bidding". [10] But it must be rf:'mcmhered that even though 
the moving party has been ad,jndieated in contempt, the court 
is not required to bar entry of the final decre(', but su('h aetion 
remains within the trial eourt's (lisl'retion. If the court deter-
mines that the Jlublic interest will be better served by finally 
and permanently dissolving the marital !'tatwl it i~ entirely 
within its powt'r to do so. (1 Armstrong, Family Law, 271.) 
[11] If one who stands ill ('ontempt of the orders of th~ 
court can still s('ek, and in the dis('r('tion of the rOllrt rl'('eivp, 
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a final Ih'I'l'l'C of 11ivol"(,I" it woult! !'rClll .·ll'ar thai (,Ilt' who 
is not ill contcmpt an!] wlto l'olllI1110t be adjud;.rul iil eontelllpL 
should ~Ial\(l 011 a llighl'r planr. If tIle "I)Urt lad;:s the pow!,!, 
to imposl' the punishment of COlltl'illpt it certainly "houltl lIot 
he permitted to assess what is, ill act uality, a greater punish-
ment--llenial of the l,'gal right to e11trr into any other rela-
tionship, To do so would be to permit thr trial court to inflict 
the continuance of a repudiated marriage' rdationship upon 
a party because of a claimed brrarh of contract. 
[12] That is exartly what has happened ill the instant 
case. The refusal to enter the final drcree for,'es the continua-
tion of a marriage ",hidl is 110 longer a going unit, and has not 
been such for a period of more than one year. Therc are no 
allegations of reconciliation or cohabitation. Tlwre has been 
neither mistake nor fraud. The parties are silllpl~- involved 
in a propc'rty dispute ai'i~ing from a contract ,,·ltil'h they 
freely executed, eal'h being rcpresentcd by counsel, in an 
attempt to settle all propcrty obligations resulting' from their 
marriag-c, The marital relationship is !"cverable from the prop-
erty rights whil'h it create:;, and final settlement of the rela-
tionship should not be depcl1(lent upon final settlrmrnt of 
corollary property intcrests. 
[ 13 ] The concept of divisible divorce has become estab-
lished in our law. Beginning with Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 
[68 S.Ct. 1~13, 92 hEd. 1561, 1 A.hR2d 1412], many cases 
have held that a divorce action which sewrs the personal 
relationship of the parties does not nccessarily determine their 
property rights, In Hudson v, Hudson, 52 Cal.2d 735 [344 
P.2d 295], this court held that an ex parte divol'ce which had 
terminated the marital status did not extinglli:;;h the wife's 
property right to alimon~·, (Sec also Webcr '-. Superior Court, 
53 Cal.2d 403 [2 Cal.Rptr. 9, 348 P.2d 572].) It is true 
that these cases were concerned with the question of juris-
diction, but thry recognize the basic proposition that severance 
of the personal relationship is divisible from a determination 
of property and support rights. 
[14] The divisible divorce is more than a jurisdictional 
concept. Sevrrance of a personal relationship which the law 
has founa to be unworkable and, as a result, injurious to the 
public welfare is not dependent upon final srttlement of prop-
erty disputes. Society will be little concerned if the parties 
engage in propl'rty litig-ation of how('ver long duration; it will 
be mm·h POIwr!'ned if two pl'ople are forerd to remain legally 





148 lIULL I'. SUPERIOR COURT [54 C.2.! 
engender addit iOllal bitterness aud uuhappincss. [15] H 
the partics dlOose to enter into a property agreement, termina-
tion of their personal status should not be conditioned upon 
compliance with this agrcement. If they cuter into an inte-
grated property settlement whieh provides for support pay-
ments as well as property allocation the entire agreement is 
considered a property agreement (Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 
36 [265 P.2d 873], and cases cited therein; Finllegan v. Finne-
gall, 42 Ca1.2d 762 l269 P.2d 873]) and should be divisible 
in toto from the final dissolution of their personal status. 
Otherwise property disputes, real and specious, could continue 
for years, effectively preventing the legal establishment of any 
other relationship by either party. (See Harrold v. Harrold, 
43 Cal.2d 77 [271 P .2d 489].) 
[16] Thomas and Geraline entered into a negotiated 
contract. If that contract has been breached, normal contract 
remedies are available. Indeed, Geraline has already filed a 
breach of contract action against Thomas. But if the trial 
court is permitted to bar entry of the final decree because it 
has determined that the contract has been breached, a very 
effective remedy of the court, heretofore reserved for contempt 
cases, will become a supplemental remedy for breach of con-
tract. Geraline elected to settle her property rights by con-
tract and she should now be required to look to contractual 
remedies, if Thomas is actually in breach. 
[ 17] Thomas contends that he has valid defenses which 
he has a right to litigate in the pending contract action. But 
the trial court, by denying his motion for final judgment, has 
already impliedly adjudged him in breach. Although this 
determination will not be binding in the contract action, 
nevertheless the pressure being exerted upon Thomas to comply 
with the terms of the contract-or reach a settlement accept-
able to Geraline-whether or not he actually has a defense 
to the alleged breach, is obvious. It is certainly improper to 
permit withholding the final decrt'e of divorce as a club to 
prevent normal determination of contract rights in a contract 
action. 
Geraline also urges that Thomas is not entitled to a final 
decree because he committed a "fraud" upon the court. The 
claimed fraud is that, in the affidavit filed in support of the 
request for the entry of the final decree, Thomas avers that 
he has complied with all of the requirements of the inter-
locutory decree. Geraline contends that Thomas knew that he 
had not complied with certain provisions of the decree, and 
that, t.hl'refore, this affidavit was deliberately fraudulent. 
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[18] It is true that a trial court has the power to bar 
entry of the final decree of divort:e if tit!' moving party at-
tempts to obtain it by frandnh'nt means. Even a final decree 
can be vacated if it has been obtained by fraud. (Miller v. 
Miller, 26 Ca1.2d 119 [156 P.2d D31].) But there is no fraud 
here. [19] Thomas's alleged noncompliance is the very 
basis of this entire controversy. He vigorously claims and has 
consistently contended that he is not in dcfault because his 
failure to comply with certain terms of the decrec is excusable. 
Geralille, with equal vigor, contends that his noncompliance 
is not excusable. This is the very dispute that will be litigated 
and determined in the pending contract action. If Thomas 
were to be precluded from obtaining a final decree because 
he alleged that he is not in dcfault, then the pending civil 
action, in which he will seek to prove that he is not in default, 
would be prejudged in advance. 
[20] Furthermore, Thomas's affidavit can hardly be said 
to perpetrate a fraud because his leg-al position was well 
known to all concerned, including the trial court. All of the 
facts involved in this propcrty dispute were before the court 
when the affidavit was filed. Geraline had already filed her 
affidavits setting forth Thomas's claimed misdeeds, in con-
junction with her motion to bar entry of the final decree. On 
September 25, 1959, three days before the allegedly fraudu-
lent affidavit was filed, Thomas filed a statement in opposition 
to Geraline's motion in which he set forth all of the facts 
involved in the property dispute and explained why his failure 
to comply with the decree was excusable. Under these cir-
cumstances he certainly did not attempt to perpetrate a fraud . 
upon the court by filing the affidavit. 
[21] Geraline also contends that the court should deny 
Thomas a final judgment of divorce because he has flouted the 
authority of the court by "remarrying" in Mexico during the 
interlocutory year and is now living in "sin" in a bigamous 
relationship within the state. There is no merit to this con-
tention. Entry of the final decree is not a reward for good 
behavior nor is the refusal to grant it a punishment. Its pur-
pose is to finally dissolve a relationship which has been 
severed in fact. It would scrve no l('gitimate purpose to com-
pel Thomas to continue to liyc ill a state of bigamy as punish-
ment for alrl'ady having done so. "It is a degradation of 
marriage and a frustration of its jHlrpOSl'S when the courts 
use it as a device for pUJlishment." (Dc Burgh v. De Burgh, 
supra, 39 Ca1.2d at p. 864.) 
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In Rwl \'. Reed. !) Cal.App. 748 {100 P. 897], plaintiff at-
templl'd to rl'"ist del'endallt's motion for entry of final judg-
ment b~' alll'going that he hall entered into "an asswned and 
pretended marriage rclatioll" during the interlocutory year, 
The court there sait! : ":May the plaintiff place detectives upon 
the trail of her husband, and watch him during the entire 
year to see if he is still faithful to his marriage vow for the 
purpose of a Bew cause of actioll f "'IV c are of opinion that such 
is not the iilterpretation to be given to the sections of the code 
as amended. . .. The Legislature, in the enactment of the 
sections, clearly did not contemplate that at the end of the year 
either party could file a supplemental complaint, and allege a 
new cause of action for divorce, or that the defeated party 
could, b~ .. such suppleIllental pleading, set forth a cause of ac-
tion by way of rccrimination, 'so as to prevent the party who 
prevailed at the first trial from having a decree entered after 
the expiration of the year. If such is the meaning of the stat· 
ute a divorce case might be kept in court for years, or during 
the life of the parties." (ld. at pp. 751,753.) 
In Hirschfeld v.Hirschfeld, 165 Cal.App.2d 474 [332 P.2d 
·397), the court refused to bar entry of the final decree on the 
ground that the moving party had "remarried" during the 
interlocutory year. The court pointed out that under the 
holdings of SI/llit'an v. SlIlUt'an, 219 Cal, 734 [28 P.2d 914], 
and A.ndcrs(}r1 Y. Anderson, 7 Ca1.2d 265 [60 P.2d 290], defend· 
ant could have annulled his second marriage, standing on his 
own wrong. "[I1]e could then procure his final divorce and 
remarry the second wife and thus validate that marriage." 
(ld. at p. 476.) Although the case is distinguishable, in that 
the partit:s did not there cohabit bigamously in California, its 
reasoning is equally applicable when the parties are living to· 
gether within this state. 
The court in the Hirschfeld ease saw no reason to require 
a circuitous method of procuring a divorce dccree. This rea· 
soning is sound. [22] It seems clear that a bigamous mar· 
riage consummated during the interlocutory year is not ade-
quate jn,:;tification for denying the bigamous party a final 
decree of divorce. (State ex reI. Hansen v. SlIperior Court, 131 
Wasl~1. 13 [228 P. 702].) The law cannot condemn an indi-
vidual to etcrnal illicit relationships because he has once erred 
simply because it docs not approve of the way in which the 
union was commenced. 
Once it has been decided that the court shall not be per-
mitted to use the continuation of the marriage status as 
May HJGO] Hl'f.:. I'. ~l'I'EHJl)H ('''l'In 
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punishment, it wllul«l ill' allOlllalO1\S tf) h<l!li that ads whit·h, 
ifcoUllllitt"d pl'ior to th(· illi""l'h'illO!'~' d"'·!'('l'. would ('011, 
stitute groUlHls for dissoh'ill~ till' lIlal'l'iagc will, if l'o1llmith'd 
subsequent to tllP illtcrloeutol'Y dl'l'rel" pl'eVl'llt ,iisSt)lutioll or 
the marriage, '1'0 so hold would be to ret Ill'n to an cxaggl'l'uh'll I 
forDl of the doctrine of recrimination expl'C'ssiy l'l'pudiated iil 
De Burgh v. De Burgh, supra. 
It is therefore ordered that a writ of mandate issue directing 
the trial court to set aside its order llcnying the motion for the ' 
entry of the final decree, to enter its order granting that 
motion, and thereupon to cllll!r judgllll!nt in conformity with 
the order. ' 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J" MeComb, J., and Dooling, J. 
pro tem.,· concurred. 
White, J., cOlleurred in the judgmcnt. 
TRAYNOR, J., COnCUl'l'illg.-My views with respect to the 
enforcement of integrated bargains by contempt proeeedings 
are set forth in dissenting opinions ill Bro!lley v. Superior 
Court, 48 Ca1.2d 509, 523 [310 P.2d 634l, and Plumer v. 
Superior Cow·t, 50 Ca1.2d 631,638 [328 P.2d 193]. Although 
those views remain ullchanged, I am bound by those eases until 
they are overruled. If they nccessarily controlled the result 
in this case, I would concur in the judgmrut undcr their 
compulsion. I do not believe they do, however, for in my 
opinion petitioner is entitled to the entry of the final decrc(' 
as a matter of right even if he could be held in contempt of 
court for not performing the conditions of the intC'rlocutory 
decree. 
Early interpretations of section 132 of the Civil Code estab-
lish that a final decree of divorce may be denied only if the 
parties are no longer entitled to the dissolution of the marriage 
because of condonation (O'Connell v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. 
App. 350, 353 [240 P. 294] ; Lane v. Superior Coltrt, 104 
Cal.App. 340, 347 [285 P. 860]) or rcconriliation (Olson v. 
Superior COllrt, 175 Cal. 250, 252·253 [165 P. 706, 1 A.L.R. 
1589]) ; if the parties were not entitled to the dissolution of 
the marriage in the first in~tance (Carp v. Superior Court, 76 
Cal.App. 481, 485 [245 P. 459] [interlocutory d('crce obtain cd 
by mistake or fraud1 ; cf. McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196 
Cal. 222,229-230 [237 P. 42, 40 A.IJ.R. 1110] ; MillCl' v. 'Miller, 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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:2G Ca1.2(1 110, 121 [156 P .2(1 0:31 J [sl'tt ing a~i(l,' fi nal deer,'c' 
prol'ured by frautlJ); or, in the court's discretion, if the mar-
riage has bcen (lissohe<1 by thc death of OIlC OJ" both parti('s. 
(Civ. Code, § 132; Glo!Jd v. Superior Court, 44 Ca1.App. 39, 
43 (185 P. 995].) Sectioll 132 also prodth's for delaying the 
('utry of the final decree pendillg appcal from the interlocutory 
judgment or motion for a new trial. That section has been 
interpreted to achicye the strange result of postponing dissolu-
tion of the marital relationship until after an appeal from the 
property part of the judgment is heard and determined, al-
though the final decree may then be entered even if the result 
of the appeal is to remand the cause for further proceeding~. 
(Harrold v. IIarrold, 43 Cal.2d 77, 83-86 [2i1 P.2d 489J.) 
l\I~' view that section 132 refers only to appeals from that 
part of the interlocutory decree dissolving the marriage is set 
forth in the concurring opinion in the Harrold case, 43 Cal.2tl 
at 86-90. (See also 1 Armstrong, California Family Law, 
272-273.) In other cases, where the parties are entitled to a 
dissolution of the marriage on the merits. entry of the final 
decree is a ministerial act. (Claudius v. Mcll'in, 146 Cal. 257. 
260-261 [79 P. 897J ; Keller v. Keller, 122 Cal.App. 712, 715 
[10 P.2d 541] ; Ringel v. Superior COllrt, 54 Ca1.App.2d 34, 
35 (128 P.2d 558] ; see Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250, 
251-252 [165 P. 706, 1 A.L.R. 1589] ; McGuinness v. Superior 
Conrt, 196 Cal. 222, 229 [237 P. 42, 40 A.L.R. 1110] ; Lane v. 
Superiol' Court, 104 Cal.App. 340, 345 [285 P. 860] ; ef. Angell 
v. Angell, 84 Cal.App.2d 339, 342 [191 P.2d 54J ; Nemer v. 
Nemer, 117 Cal.App.2d 35, 38 [254 P.2d 661].) 
Four California cases would add as another ground for 
denying entry of the final decree the moving party's disregard 
of the court's orders. (Weeks v. Superior COlll·t, 187 Cal. 620, 
622 [203 P. 93] ; Sullivan v. Supcrior Court. 72 Cal.App. 531. 
535-536 (237 P. 782J ; Pearson v. Superior Court. 32 Cal.App. 
2d 87, 8!) [89 P.2d 162] ; Knackstedt v. Superior Court, 79 
Cal.App.2d 727, 729 [180 P.2d 375].) The Weeks case, upon 
which the other three cases rest, relies upon O'Neill v. Thomas 
Day Co., 152 Cal. 357, 362-363 [92 P. 856, 14 Ann.Cas. 970], 
a personal injury action in which plaintiff refused to answer 
pertinent questions under subpoena at a deposition proceed-
ing. The court's declaration in 0 'Neill that "certainly no 
plaintiff can, with right or reason, ask the aid anu assistance 
of a court in hearing his demands, while he stands in an atti-
tude of contempt to its legal orders and processes" was not 
formulated with the policy considerations appropriate to a 
) 
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divorce action in mind. The \Y ('eks l'Olll't 11lltlet·took to incor-
porate the 0 'Neill rule into divorce law by relring upon 
the Olson case, supra, 175 Cal. 250, 252-253. The Olson 
case, however, was ill suited to that purpose, for it inyolvcu 
an unconditional reconciliation-a situation plainly distin- I 
guishable from contempt and one in which entry of thl' final 
decree is not ordinarily wa rrantcd. The 'Weeks case failed 
to notice the significant diffrrencr in terms of public policy 
between a final decree of divorce anu other processes withhelu 
from disobedient contestants in eh'il eases. 
A court's power to withhold its processes, like its power to 
punish for contempt, rests on the necessity of upholding the 
court's dignity and enforcing its orders, (See In rc Short-
ridge, 99 Cal. 526, 532 [34 P. 227, 37 Am.St.Rep. 78, 21 A.L.R. 
755] ; Raiden v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d 83, 86 [206 P.2d 
1081] .) A court exercising this power may dismiss (K l100b 
v. Knoob, 192 Cal. 93, 97 [218 P. 568] ; MacPherson v. Jlae-
Pherson, 13 Ca1.2d 271, 277 [89 P.2d 382]) or stay (Boren-
stein v. Borenstein, 11 Ca1.2d 301, 302 [78 P.2d 388] ; Ilrog 
v. Krog, 32 Ca1.2d 812, 818-819 [198 P.2d 510]; Kopasz v. 
Kopasz, 34 Ca1.2d 423, 425 [210 P.2d 846]) the appeal of a 
recalcitrant party to the divorce action: deny a change of 
venue (Ross v. Ross, 48 Cal.App.2d 72, 78 [119 P.2d 444] ) ; 
refuse to permit the taking of depositions (Paddon v. Superior 
Court, 65 Cal.App. 479, 479-480 [224 P. 474]) or the intro-
duction I)f evidcnce (Schubert Y. Superior COltl't, 10!) Cal.App. 
633, 635-636 [293 P. 814] ) ; refuse to vacate an interlocutory 
(Travis v. Trauis, 89 Cal.App.2d 292, 295 [200 P.2d 843J) or 
a final decree (Soderberg v. Sode/'bcry, 63 Cal.App. 492, 494-
495 [219 P. 82J) ; or deny the writs of mandate and prohibition 
(Funfar v. Superior Cmtrl, 107 Cal.App. 488, 490-491 [290 
P. 626] ). (See alRo the questionable exercise of this power in 
Kubon v. Kubon, 51 Cal.2d 229, 232 [331 P.2d 636J ; dissenting 
opinion, 233.) \Vhen, however, there has beell a final deter-
mination that the marriage should be disRolyccl, it is my 
opinion that the public interest in vindicating judieial dignity 
should yield to its interest in preserving the sanctity of mar-
riage when the proeC5S soug-ht to be withheld is a final decree 
of divorce, for" lilt is a degradation of marriage and a frus-
tration of its purposcs when the courts use it as a clevire for 
punishment." (Dc Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 864 
[250 P.2d 598].) 
I would therefore overrule the \Yeeks case and disapprove 
the Sullivan, Pearsoll, and Knackstedt cases alld hoW that the 
) 
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trial court lacks discretion to withhold cutry of the final decree 
of divorce solely because the moving party stands in disregard 
of its orders. 
